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ABSTRACT
Objective To examine whether business improvement
districts (BID) contributed to greater than expected
declines in the incidence of violent crimes in affected
neighbourhoods.
Method A Bayesian hierarchical model was used to
assess the changes in the incidence of violent crimes
between 1994 and 2005 and the implementation of 30
BID in Los Angeles neighbourhoods.
Results The implementation of BID was associated with
a 12% reduction in the incidence of robbery (95%
posterior probability interval  2 to 24) and an 8%
reduction in the total incidence of violent crimes (95%
posterior probability interval  5 to 21). The strength of
the effect of BID on robbery crimes varied by location.
Conclusion These ﬁndings indicate that the
implementation of BID can reduce the incidence of
violent crimes likely to result in injury to individuals. The
ﬁndings also indicate that the establishment of a BID by
itself is not a panacea, and highlight the importance of
targeting BID efforts to crime prevention interventions
that reduce violence exposure associated with criminal
behaviours.
Research indicates the importance of community-
level attributes for explaining the incidence of
interpersonal violence and crime in neighbour-
hoods, but there are few examples of effective
community-level violence prevention inter-
ventions.
1e3 Several studies suggest that imple-
mentation of the community economic
development model of the business improvement
district (BID) reduces crime in affected neighbour-
hoods.
45The BID model relies on special assess-
ments levied on commercial properties located
within designated business areas to augment
services typically provided by public agencies,
including sanitation, public safety, place marketing
and planning efforts.
6 Although managed and
operated by private sector non-proﬁt organisations,
the majority of BID are public entities, chartered
and regulated by local governments.
7 The services
delivered through BID assessment schemes,
however, do not typically replace current public
services. BID services typically are directed towards
sanitation and security of common public space
areas such as sidewalks (and not interior spaces),
analogous to the common area service arrange-
ments seen in home owners’ associations.
8 BID
often focus their budgets on providing private
security to their business locales and surrounding
neighbourhoods, as a basic level of enhancement to
publicly funded police services.
9
One of the more rigorous evaluations of BID by
Brooks
5 indicated that their adoption in areas of Los
Angeles was associated with a signiﬁcant drop in
the number of serious crimes reported to the police
between 1990 and 2002, controlling for time stable
differences between areas and in comparison with
neighbourhoods that proposed BID but did not end
up adopting them. Given that the adoption of
a BID in Los Angeles requires extensive support
from business and property owners (eg, at least
15% of the business owners or 50% of the property
owners must sign supporting petitions) and
a laborious process of legal and legislative oversight,
the simple proposed adoption of a BID may not
provide a strong comparison group.
10 11 The actual
process of BID adoption is, by itself, a signal of
commitment from business merchants and land-
owners to promote economic development through
various community change activities. Even after
taking into account time stable area differences in
the average volume of crime, poverty rates and
other neighbourhood features, it is difﬁcult to
reconcile whether establishing a BID is independent
from other facets of community change that may
presage drops in crime. A detailed analysis of
budget data and observations of neighbourhoods in
Los Angeles where BID are situated, for example,
showed that their priorities of spending were
correlated with observable indicators of neigh-
bourhood physical decay and surrounding
economic conditions.
12 Therefore, using the BID
area before BID implementation may be a more
appropriate comparison group.
We rely on a preepost intervention design to
assess the effects of BID on the incidence of violent
crimes. We use the year of implementation to
reﬂect the exposure to the BID intervention and
examine the preepost changes in the incidence of
violent crimes in affected neighbourhoods,
controlling for overall time trends.
METHODS
Design
We examined BID effects by modelling the
preepost changes in the incidence or rate of violent
crimes from 1994 to 2005 for all neighbourhood
areas exposed to BID. Between 1996 and 2003,
a total of 30 separate BID were implemented in Los
Angeles. The unit of analysis is any of the 30
neighbourhood areas that eventually adopted a BID
in Los Angeles during the period of observation.
Table 1 reports the number of BID areas that
became fully operational at any given year. We
consider a BID fully operational if its implementa-
tion occurred for the entire calendar year. The
formulation of BID in Los Angeles requires
a formalised and uniform planning and adoption
stage that is structured by law. Details are provided
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12 For all the areas that eventually adopted a BID in
Los Angeles, there are at least 2 years’ worth of data during
which no BID (pre) was operational and, similarly, at least
2 years of data during which all the BID were fully operational
(post). We make use of this type of interrupted time series to
estimate the average BID effect on the rate of violent crimes.
Data
The data consist of the yearly counts of ofﬁcially recorded violent
felony crimes (homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) by
the Los Angeles Police Department that were aggregated from
policereportingdistrictstocorrespondingBIDareas.Ifareporting
district is present in a BID this district is counted as receiving the
BID intervention. A total of 179 reporting districts are present in
the30BIDneighbourhoodareas.Wefocusprimarilyonthecounts
ofrobbery,because thiscrimeis lesssusceptibleto underreporting
by the police, is more likely than other crimes to occur in public
settings between strangers and just over 30% of people who are
robbed experience an injury.
13e15 Nearly one out of ﬁve robberies
nationally result in a serious injury that requires medical treat-
ment, such as a gunshot wound, knife/stab/slash wound, broken
bones or teeth, internal injury and/or loss of consciousness.
16 17
The estimated social costs of an average robbery are high, with an
average cost of US$39287 (in 2005 dollars) if one includes
monetary costs associated with medical and emergency services,
lost productivity, mental health and general quality of life.
18 By
focussing our analysis primarily on violent crimes, and in partic-
ular robbery, we are offering a closer look at the effective role that
BID expend on crime prevention efforts that attempt to improve
the social control of public space areas through environmental
design modiﬁcations and spending on private security. We do not
examine property crime offences because they are less likely to be
reportedtothepolice,manyoccur inprivate settings (eg,larceny/
theft) and are not ‘street crimes’ directly subject to BID efforts to
enhance social control in public spaces.
Time trends
Table 2 presents a summary of the average frequency of robbery
and all violent crimes for areas exposed to BID compared with
non-BID areas that incorporate the rest of Los Angeles. The
simple linear trend of these data indicates that BID areas expe-
rienced greater, on average, yearly reductions in the incidence of
robbery and violence than non-BID areas. For example, the
average yearly reduction in robbery was 1.9 in BID areas,
compared with 1.2 in non-BID areas. The log of the average
robbery counts indicates a 7% reduction in BID areas compared
with a 5.7% reduction in non-BID areas. During the 12-year
period, however, the average yearly count of reported violent
offences dropped by 58% for Los Angeles as a whole, suggesting
that it is important to take into account this secular trend in
assessing the effects of BID on violent crimes.
Statistical model
We used a Bayesian hierarchical model to assess the preepost
effects of BID adoption in areas that were exposed to BID. We
estimate the BID effect in each individual area and the average
BID effect across all areas. We model the number of reported
robberies and violent crimes with a Poisson distribution with
mean (lit) for each of the 30 BID areas (i) over a 12-year (t) time
period. We include a random effect parameter for areas to scale
the time trend for the volume of crimes in each BID area, and to
account for time invariant differences across the 30 BID areas.
We account for the overall 12-year crime time trend in Los
Angeles with a natural cubic spline.
19 As the yearly incidence of
violent crimes for Los Angeles as a whole was declining over the
12-year study period, it is important to account for the secular
trend in the model so as not to overestimate the BID effect. The
population at risk of violent crimes in each BID area is
unknown, representing a mix of residents and non-residents (eg,
shoppers). We bypass the problem of having to estimate the
population at risk of violent crimes by comparing every BID area
with itself. Under the assumption that the population at risk
Table 1 BID by year of observation in Los Angeles
Year
No of BID
started BID area
1994 e
1995 e
1996 2 Wilshire Centre
Fashion District
1997 2 Hollywood Entertainment I
San Pedro
1998 6 Los Feliz Village
Larchmont Village
Downtown Centre
Figueroa Corridor
Century Corridor
Greater Lincoln Heights
1999 11 Granada Hills
Canoga Park
Van Nuys Boulevard Auto Row
Tarzana
Studio City
Hollywood Media
Westwood Village
Historic Core (Downtown)
Toy District
Downtown Industrial
Jefferson Park
2000 2 Chatsworth
Sherman Oaks
2001 4 Encino
Los Angeles Chinatown
Wilmington
Lincoln Heights Industrial
2002 2 Northridge
Highland Park
2003 1 Reseda
2004 0 e
2005 0 e
Source: Los Angeles City Clerk’s Ofﬁce.
BID, business improvement district.
Table 2 Average crimes, by year in BID and non-BID reporting districts
Year
Non-BID areas (n[893) BID areas (n[179)
Robbery Violent Robbery Violent
M (median) M (median) M (median) M (median)
1994 25.88 (17) 64.27 (42) 41.6 (35) 86.53 (66)
1995 24.01 (16) 60.89 (41) 41.56 (35) 89.75 (74)
1996 21.06 (13) 54.70 (35) 34.3 (29) 77.35 (61)
1997 16.85 (11) 49.14 (33) 29.37 (24) 70.52 (57)
1998 13.06 (8) 42.99 (28) 22.34 (17) 59.77 (51)
1999 11.82 (7) 40.58 (26) 19.98 (16) 56.46 (46)
2000 12.90 (8) 43.63 (26) 21.66 (18) 60.26 (51)
2001 15.43 (10) 49.38 (31) 26.20 (21) 68.74 (55)
2002 14.05 (8) 44.56 (26) 24.83 (20) 62.94 (54)
2003 13.60 (8) 42.24 (26) 23.92 (19) 60.21 (51)
2004 11.81 (7) 36.65 (22) 19.43 (15) 49.12 (44)
2005 11.49 (7) 26.49 (15) 18.06 (14) 37.91 (34)
Average 16.00 (9) 46.29 (28) 26.94 (10) 64.96 (52)
Linear trend  1.2  2.5  1.9  3.6
Each column presents the average (M) and median (50th percentile) values for the number
of incidents in business improvement district (BID) and non-BID areas.
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Original articledoes not change over time, we propose a model that has as the
main parameter of interest for area i the ratio (Ki) of the crime
rate if a BID was adopted divided by the crime rate that the
trends predict would have happened if the BID had not been
adopted. If Ki is less than 1, this indicates that the presence of
a BID in area (i) is associated with a reduction in the incidence of
violent crimes for that area. We use a Bayesian hierarchical
model to assess individual effects across each BID area (i) and to
approximate the average overall BID effect (mK) across all 30
areas.
20 Full technical details on the model and speciﬁcation of
priors are available elsewhere.
12
The yearly violent crime trends fora sample of12 of the30 BID
areas are displayed in ﬁgure 1 and show the timing of each of the
BID interventions (denoted by a vertical line). Figure 1 provides
a visual sense for the fact that the Bayesian hierarchical model is
estimatinganinterruptedtimeseriesforeachuniqueBIDareaand
then pooling the effect across all areas. The Poisson model implies
the counterfactual that the rate of violent crimes in an area after
theBIDbecomesfullyoperationalisproportionaltowhattherate
would have been in that area had the BID not been implemented.
RESULTS
Table 3 reports the overall BID effect for the incidence of robbery
and violent crimes in terms of the percentage reductions
(posterior mean) associated with the adoption of BID and the
95% posterior probability intervals. Table 3 also reports the
posterior probability of observing an overall BID effect on
reducing the incidence of robbery and violent crimes (P(mK<1),
where mK represents the overall effect across the 30 BID areas.
We ﬁnd that the posterior probability of a BID effect is 0.96. In
other words, there is strong evidence that BID reduced the
robbery rate. The estimated percentage reduction: obtained as
one minus the posterior mean (mK) indicates a 12% average
reduction (95% posterior probability interval  2 to 24) in the
incidence of robbery associated with the implementation of BID.
For the total incidence of violence BID effects are in the same
direction, but the statistical evidence is not as strong (P(mK <1)¼
0.91), and indicates an 8% average reduction (95% posterior
probability interval  5 to 21) in the total incidence of violence
associated with the adoption of BID.
Given that the observed probability of an overall BID effect
was strongest for robbery, table 4 reports the BID area-speciﬁc
effects for ofﬁcial reports of robbery in terms of percentage
reductions in robberies (1eKi). The individual BID area results
for robbery show that for 14 of the 30 areas the posterior
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Figure 1 Total violent crime counts for select business improvement district (BID) areas. Note: year of BID implementation noted in vertical lines.
Table 3 Estimated percentage reduction in reported violent crimes
from BID
Outcomes
Posterior
mean*
95% Posterior
probability
interval
Posterior probability
BID effect (P(mK <1))
Robbery 12 ( 2,24) 0.96
Violent 8 ( 5,21) 0.91
*Posterior mean reﬂects the percentage reduction as calculated by (1 mK)3100.
BID, business improvement district.
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Original articleprobability of observing a BID effect is 0.90 or higher. In terms of
effect sizes for these 14 areas, the robbery rate is reduced by
a high of 27% in the Century Corridor BID to a low of 14% in
the Downtown Industrial BID. For another two BID areas, the
observed posterior probability is more than 0.80, which still
provides evidence for the presence of a BID effect in the expected
direction. The BID effects appear to be most pronounced for the
incidence of robbery, which one would expect is likely to be
affected by environmental features of the neighbourhoods, such
as hiring private security ofﬁcers, which are the focus of BID
efforts to control public space areas. Overall, there seems to be
evidence in the data that the BID in Los Angeles had an effect in
reducing the incidence of reported robberies.
Given the size of the BID effects appear to be most
pronounced for robbery, this raises the question of how much
BID spending occurs in relation to social costs saved by reducing
robberies. Multiplying our estimated 12% (annual) reduction to
the average incidence of robberies (M¼160.7) associated with
BID implementation to the estimated social costs (US$39287 in
2005 dollars)
18 of an average robbery shows a marginal cost
saving of approximately US$757611 (in 2005 dollars) (annu-
ally). Given that the average annual budget of the 30 BID in Los
Angeles was approximately US$736670 (in 2005 dollars),
12 this
suggests that a sizeable social costebeneﬁt of BID imple-
mentation can be attributed to the reductions in robbery alone.
Additional tests
We also conducted several additional tests on our measures of
violent crime and the methods for approximating BID effects.
Homicides, for example, are the most accurately reported violent
crimes, but we did not discuss the yearly trends in homicide
because the counts are so low. The average number of homicides
per year in neighbourhoods associated with BID is less than one,
and the median (50th percentile) is zero. The point estimates
from replicating our model for homicide counts varies widely,
and the probability of detecting a BID effect is low (P(mK<1)¼
0.43)), suggesting that BID have no appreciable effect on
homicide. In particular, the homicide model indicates a 5%
increase associated with BID adoption but with a large CI (95%
posterior probability interval  50 to 29), resulting from low
counts and imprecision in our estimate. A combined estimate of
the count of robbery and homicide together was statistically
identical to that of robbery alone, suggesting that the BID
adoption effect observed is driven by the rate of robberies.
We also constructed alternative model speciﬁcations in line
with previous work that Brooks
5 used on an analysis of the
effects of BID on reported serious crimes in Los Angeles during
earlier years. We compared the estimated effect of BID imple-
mentation on robberies and all reported violent crimes using all
police reporting districts in Los Angeles as the unit of analysis,
including those that do not intersect BID areas. We then
included a dummy variable denoting the timing of BID, adjacent
neighbourhoods to BID as control variables, and ﬁxed-effect
terms (dummy variables) for each individual reporting district,
year, and their interactions (reporting district*year). Our results
from these speciﬁcations were sensitive to the parameterisation
of the outcomes. If we relied on ordinary least squares regression
we found a statistically signiﬁcant BID effect in reducing the
mean incidence of robberies (b¼ 4.63; p<0.001) and all violent
crimes (b¼ 7.33; p<0.001) by approximately 16% and 11%,
respectively. However, if we relied on a Poisson regression model
the results were substantially lower and were only marginally
signiﬁcant for robberies (b¼ 0.02; p¼0.07) and total violence
(b¼ 0.01; p¼0.09), reducing the respective incidence by 3% and
2%. We think this sensitivity test provides further justiﬁcation
for our use of a simpler model that estimates only the BID
effects for those areas that eventually adopted BID, rather than
assigning BID effects to the entire city of Los Angeles.
Limitations
The Bayesian hierarchical model provides an estimate of the
effect of BID on the incidence of robbery and violent crimes in
areas that were exposed to BID. Like all models this approach
has several limitations. First, the model assumes that the
population at risk of violence does not change once a BID starts.
It is, however, possible that the establishment of a BID could
change the population at risk of violent crimes in a number of
ways. If, for example, there is a substantial increase in the
number of shoppers or new residents because a BID was
implemented then even a substantial decline in the incidence of
violence would be offset by an increase in the denominator for
the population at risk. Such an increase in the population at risk
of violence would lead one to conclude that the adoption of the
BID did not have an effect in reducing violence. Assuming that
the population at risk coincides with the residential population
in an area would be incorrect, as it is almost certain that
successfully implemented BID attract a larger number of people
for commerce to areas.
Second, the model assumes that the level to which violent
crimes are reported to the police does not change systematically
with the adoption of a BID. If, however, the adoption of a BID
implies an increase in local merchants’ and residents’ willingness
to report crimes to the police and an increased response from the
Table 4 Area-speciﬁc estimates of BID effects on robbery
BID name
Posterior
mean (1eKi)
BID effect
(p[Ki<1) 95% Posterior CI
Granada Hills 18 0.93  6, 37
Chatsworth 5 0.65  20, 25
Northridge 18 0.94  5, 36
Reseda 15 0.90  9, 33
Canoga Park 3 0.60  24, 25
Van Nuys 26 0.99 7, 41
Tarzana  10 0.25  44, 16
Encino 11 0.76  22, 35
Sherman Oaks 10 0.76  18, 31
Studio City 9 0.76  20, 31
Los Feliz Village 21 0.98 1, 39
Highland Park 11 0.83  14, 30
Hollywood Entertainment 9 0.80  16, 28
Hollywood Media 15 0.95  5, 32
Larchmont Village 34 0.99 5, 53
Wilshire Centre 4 0.63  25, 26
Los Angeles Chinatown 21 0.98 0, 38
Westwood Village 21 0.97  1, 39
Downtown Centre 7 0.74  17, 25
Historic Core 1 0.55  21, 21
Toy District 8 0.77  16, 27
Fashion District  24 0.05  63, 5
Downtown Industrial 14 0.90 e8, 31
Figueroa Corridor 20 0.96  2, 36
Jefferson Park 17 0.95  4, 33
Century Corridor 27 1.00 8, 43
Wilmington e7 0.28  34, 14
San Pedro 8 0.75  18, 29
Lincoln Heights 11 0.77  20, 34
Greater Lincoln Heights 25 1.00 6, 41
Ki¼ratio of robbery crimes (post-business improvement district (BID)/pre-BID). Bold
indicates a BID with a probability of a BID effect of $0.90.
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actually increase as a function of the implementation of a BID. If
this were the case, the adopted model would suggest that
adopting a BID has the effect of increasing the incidence of
violent crimes. Given that the ﬁndings suggest an overall effect
of BID on reducing the robbery rate and marginal effects for all
violent crimes, we have some conﬁdence in these results.
In addition, if one assumes that BID areas have unique
features in terms of the businesses that operate and the
communities that encourage their establishment, constructing
a group of comparison areas that are matched to the BID areas
with respect to certain demographic features of area residents
would represent a less conservative test of the effects of BID. We
think that the areas that will eventually adopt a BID are the best
comparison group for those areas that have already adopted
a BID, as there are clearly features of BID areas that are unique
in their ability to get a majority of landowners and merchants
interested in their adoption. At the same time, our analysis
offers no prescription for the various mechanisms by which BID
impact robbery rates. BID adopt a variety of tactics, such as
mobilising the police, hiring private security ofﬁcers, street
cleaning and environmental redesign to increase a sense of
cleanliness and safety of BID areas. Unfortunately, the tactics
adopted by each BID area are complex and not easy to approx-
imate in a statistical model.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The results from this study suggest that BID reduce the rate of
robbery crimes in affected Los Angeles neighbourhoods. The
overall effect of BID on robberies is consistent with the efforts
that many of these Los Angeles BID expend on improving the
physical appearance of their areas to make them more attractive
to commercial business and less attractive to potential offenders
(eg, painting over grafﬁti, increased street lighting, closed-circuit
television, or CCTV, cameras). The size of the BID effect on
robberies varies across the 30 BID areas and appears to indicate
a greater than expected reduction in robberies in those located in
neighbourhoods that have undergone signiﬁcant patterns of
economic development or invested heavily in crime prevention.
For example, BID area-speciﬁc effects were apparent in Jefferson
Park and Figueroa Corridor, which are situated close to the
University of Southern California, in areas of notable gentriﬁ-
cation and economic development. Hollywood Media and
Larchmont also exhibited BID-area-speciﬁc effects on the inci-
dence of robberies and are situated in neighbourhoods under-
going gentriﬁcation. BID effects are present in Century Corridor,
Figueroa Corridor and Hollywood Media, all of which invest
heavily in crime prevention through hiring private security
ofﬁcers and other activities.
10e12 Los Angeles BID spend
a considerable share of their resources hiring private security or
public ambassadors who focus on keeping streetscapes clean and
safe, thereby increasing the level of social control in public
spaces. Approximately 13 of the 30 BID in Los Angeles spend
more than US$200000 a year (2005 dollars) on such ‘clean’ and
‘safe’ efforts. These strategies are closely linked to research and
theory on crime prevention through environmental design to
reduce opportunities for crime and violence and, in particular,
robbery.
21e23
Given the limited budgets and staff of many BID, it is of no
surprise that the mere presence of a BID is not uniformly
associated with a reduced incidence of violence. Some BID spend
as much as half their annual budgets on crime prevention and
environmental redesign or beautiﬁcation efforts. BID crime
prevention activities may also garner additional resources from
the police, as the police now have an active ‘partner’ in
a community. Other established Los Angeles BID have relatively
small budgets and focus their efforts primarily on place
promotion in an effort to foster improved commercial activity
for their constituent businesses.
12 While the protocol for estab-
lishing a BID in Los Angeles is uniform and codiﬁed into law,
12
the dosage of tactics to improve neighbourhood environments
varies between BID areas. Relying on a conservative estimate of
preepost changes in reported violent crimes for only those areas
that adopted BID we found signiﬁcant overall effects on robbery,
with some BID areas exhibiting greater effects than others. We
cannot say whether spending on private security or economic
development efforts caused these reductions or are merely
correlated with them. This study relied on observational data,
which limits our ability to infer as to whether the correlations
observed are causally related. We attempted to remove the
potential selection effects of establishing a BID by estimating
preepost effects on reported violent crimes for only those areas
that eventually adopted a BID. In the absence of an experi-
mental design in which BID are randomly assigned to neigh-
bourhoods we do not know whether BID activities actually
caused the declines in robbery rates.
The efforts spent by BID in Los Angeles on economic devel-
opment activities and social control efforts that focus on crime
prevention, beautiﬁcation and advocating for more public safety
and sanitation services to many blighted sections of Los
Angeles
12 are associated with a reduction in the incidence of
robberies. This information can assist in designing and testing
the feasibility of BID as a community-level violence prevention
intervention.
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What is already known on this subject
< The incidence of violence is associated with neighbourhood
environments.
< BID focus on public safety.
< Community economic development models may help reduce
crime.
What this study adds
< The ﬁrst systematic look at the effects of BID on violent
crimes.
< Rigorous methodology for assessing the effects of BID on
violent crimes.
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